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Abstract
This paper proposes a new algorithm to compute the residual risk of failure of an
explosion protection system on an industrial process plant. A graph theoretic frame-
work is used to model the process. Both the main reasons of failure are accounted for,
viz. hardware failure and inadequate protection even when the protection hardware
functions according to specifications. The algorithm is shown to be both intuitive
and simple to implement in practice. Its application is demonstrated with a realistic
example of a protection system installation on a spray drier.
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1 Introduction
Explosion protection systems designed and installed on industrial processing plants offer
protection against the prevailing and the envisioned explosion hazards. For any explosion
protection system installation, there is a non-zero probability that the system will fail to
mitigate an explosion. We will refer to this probability as the residual risk. The purpose
of this paper is to quantify this risk of explosion protection system failure in a tractable
manner. While the underlying science behind flame propagation and explosion mitigation
means is well understood, and extensively studied (Bartknecht (1993), Eckhoff (2003), Siwek
and Cesana (2001), Moore and Spring (2004)), the computation of risk of explosion protec-
tion failure for the process plant as a whole is a non-trivial problem and has received far
less attention. Owners/operators, who carry the ultimate responsibility, are making a key
decision on the acceptability of a specific safety system configuration - often without a clear
methodology to quantify or ascribe residual risk which it entails. We set out a systematic
methodology for quantifying the residual risk for installed explosion mitigation provisions
in process systems, and demonstrate how this can help in making decisions about balancing
safety requirements and cost-effectiveness.
A directed graph representation (see, e.g. West (2001), chapter 1) is used to represent the
process plant and the intended or installed explosion safety system as a whole, comprising a
set of vertices linked by directed edges. Each vertex represents a process vessel (e.g. a drier
or a cyclone) and is characterised by a set of connectivity and probability parameters. This
conceptual architecture allows the cumulative probability of failure to be computed by a
simple algebraic model. The computational model and the processing algorithm explicitly
accounts for both the principal mechanisms of failure; viz. a complete failure of the safety
system (e.g. due to a critical hardware failure) and a failure due to inadequate protection
(e.g. due to the reduced explosion pressure of a suppressed or vented explosion occurrence
still being greater than the pressure shock resistance of the vessel). This paper demonstrates
the computation of residual risk using this methodology for a typical example of a process
plant where explosible dust represents the principal explosion hazard (see Barton (2002) for
a detailed analysis of this hazard). The selected example illustrates some of the prevalent
protection issues in a simple spray drying process. The explosion protection options of explo-
sion venting, explosion suppression and explosion isolation (using either triggered chemical
barriers or triggered mechanical barriers) are considered.We demonstrate how a change in
the protection system design affects the residual risk of an unmitigated explosion, thereby
providing a clear and quantifiable trade-off between the achieved level of protection and cost.
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This methodology will also assist operators in meeting their obligations under the European
Regulations (ATEX (2005)) to assess and ascribe the residual risk of unmitigated explosions.
In the authors’ view, the proposed model is also a convincing example of collaboration be-
tween process industry practitioners and academic researchers working in operations research
to solve a challenging industrial problem.
Recently, development of a very useful calculation tool for quantitative risk assessment was
reported in van der Voort et al (2007). The focus of this reference is on computing risk
contours using knowledge of the flame propagation and the consequence of a dust explosion.
In contrast to this work, the focus of our methodology is to provide a simple and effective
means for cost/benefit analysis in choosing a explosion safety system for a given plant.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a short, non-technical
tutorial on explosion protection systems. In section 3, a directed graph based representation
of such installations is presented. Section 4 provides the main contribution of this paper
where a new, systematic method to compute residual risk in an explosion protection system is
presented. This method is illustrated through a comprehensive example in section 5. Finally,
section 6 summarises the contribution and outlines the direction of present research.
2 Explosion Protection Installations: A Primer
We first outline the basic issues involved in explosion protection installations. For the sake of
completeness, the generic components and their functions are reviewed briefly. This section
also establishes some of the notation which will be used in the subsequent sections.
• A process plant typically comprises a series of interconnected vessels in which different
operations such as drying, grinding, filtering or mixing are carried out. Each vessel has its
own pressure shock resistance, which we denote by P s . This is a pressure that the vessel
can withstand without physical deformation. Many processes involve potential sources
of ignition (e.g. mechanical friction in a grinder) as well as potential fuels to cause an
explosion (e.g. any dispersed and combustible dust). In the event of an ignition, the flame
propagates from the ignition kernel causing the pressure inside a vessel to rise beyond P s ,
leading to a considerable damage to the plant and a possible risk to human life. To avoid
this scenario, explosion protection systems are installed in process plants.
• Depending on the requirements, either explosion suppression or explosion venting means
(or both) are installed on each vessel deemed to be at risk. Explosion suppression rapidly
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deploys appropriate flame suppressant to quench the propagating flame front while explo-
sion vent panels installed onto vessel walls rupture to mitigate the rising pressure within
the plant item. Explosion venting is a passive mitigation means since the vent panels yield
at a prescribed pressure. Both the protection methodologies aim at reducing the explo-
sive pressure increase to a value below P s . In either case, it is possible to calculate the
expected reduced pressure after mitigation for a given protection system. We denote this
reduced pressure by Pred . Note that a different number of suppressors or different types
of suppressors will yield different Pred for the same vessel. The same comment applies
for the number and the types of vent panels. For a successful explosion mitigation in any
vessel, the inequality Pred < P s must hold. The parameters Pred and P s are discussed
in more detail in section 4.2.
• For explosion suppression, an explosion event is typically detected by pressure detectors,
which detect a rise (or the rate of rise) in pressure. The detector sends this signal to
a control panel which then deploys the suppressors. A control panel may be common to
several vessels which together form a protection zone. In case of explosion isolation between
connected vessels, optical flame detection is also used on the mouth of the connecting duct.
• Following a mitigated explosion event in one vessel, flame often propagates along adjoining
duct-work causing further explosions in connected vessels. An explosion due to a prop-
agated flame may be more intense than the explosion due to a direct ignition, due to
increased turbulence and a jet flame ignition; see Holbrow et al (1999) for guidance on
containment and venting of explosions due to flame propagation. The installed protection
system on each vessel should account for the possibility of explosion by flame propagation.
The ducts where there is a risk of flame propagation may have an explosion isolation bar-
rier installed which may either be a transient chemical barrier (i.e. a suppressor) or a fast
acting valve both of which reduce the likelihood of flame passage. This barrier is deployed
in the case of an explosion in the upstream or downstream vessels by the corresponding
control panel.
• In case of a chemical or a mechanical barrier as above, the time for the barrier to be
established and the time for the flame to reach the barrier can be computed (subject to
suitable assumptions). We denote these two times by tb and tf respectively. For a successful
explosion isolation, the inequality tb < tf must hold, i.e. the barrier is established before
the arrival of the flame front. The parameters tb and tf are discussed in more detail in
section 4.2.
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Fig. 1. Spray drier explosion protection installation
LIQUID
AIR & DUST
HOT AIR
PRODUCT
FAN
CLEAN AIR
HOT AIR
AIR & DUST
PRODUCT
D1
SPRAY DRIER
(SD)
FLUID BED DRIER 1
(FBD1)
FLUID BED DRIER 2
(FBD2)
CYCLONE 1
(C1)
D2
CYCLONE 2
(C2) VentVent
D2
ZONE 1
ZONE 2
ZONE 3
Isolation
Valve
3 Directed Graph Representation
In our formulation, the industrial process plants under study are represented by a fully
connected, directed graph and each vessel in the system is represented as a vertex. The
edges between the vertices represent paths of possible flame propagation (e.g. duct-work
between different vessels) in case of an ignition. Between any pair of adjacent vertices, there
are two directed edges in opposite directions. Each edge is associated with a weight which
represents the probability of flame propagating down the duct in question. The upstream and
downstream flame propagation probabilities are typically different due to the bulk movement
of the material. To represent this, we impose a restriction that any pair of adjacent vertices
(u, v) have two edges between them, one where u is a tail and another where u is a head.
This simple representation is best explained through an example. Figure 1 shows a spray
drying process. A wet dairy product is spray dried, and then passes through two fluid bed
driers that further reduce the moisture content of the final product. Dust content in the
drying air is separated by a ganged pair of cyclones, and returned through a fines return line
to the spray drier. Spray drier designs that use a fines return loop are known to be more
susceptible to dust explosion incidents because of the higher level of connectivity between
the fluid bed driers and the spray drier. In this example, explosion protection is achieved
by appropriate explosion relief vent panels installed on the cyclones, and by a three-zone
explosion suppression system. Protection zones will be explained in more detail in section 5.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding directed graph representation for this process. We can use
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Fig. 2. Directed graph representation for spray drier system
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vertices and vessels interchangeably; keeping in mind that one is an abstract representation
of the other. Table 1 lists all the vertices for reference.
It is worth mentioning that this is not a simple graph (see West (2001) for a definition)
since it will always have multiple edges. This restricts the applicability of standard tools of
representing graphs and performing operations such as enumeration. However, the graphs
of real process plants rarely have more that 8 vertices, so that the computation of joint
probabilities is not too taxing.
4 A Model for computation of residual risk
4.1 Assumptions
We first introduce the assumptions and the notation, which are used to specify the resid-
ual risk model. The assumptions are based on experience of professionals in the explosion
protection industry regarding what needs to be taken into account in modelling the residual
risk.
• We use the probability of an unmitigated explosion in any one of the vessels in the process
in a given unit of time as a proxy for residual risk. The unit of time may be consistent
with the maintenance schedule, although any other time duration may be postulated for
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comparing different safety configurations.
• In any vessel, an ignition may occur at any location with equal probability.
• An unmitigated explosion in any vessel or at any vertex is considered as a failure. We do
not account for differing severity of failure in different vessels. In reality, failure of some
vessels may merely lead to inconvenience rather than a catastrophe. However, treating
all failures as equally catastrophic still yields valuable information in comparing different
choices of safety system configurations.
• Given an ignition event at a vertex, only the probabilities of an unmitigated explosion
at the same vertex or adjacent vertices are considered in the computation of risk. This
assumption is made mainly for simplicity of exposition and can easily be relaxed in practice.
• We assume that there is only one type of detector and at most two different types of
suppressors on any vessel. This is a fairly realistic assumption from a practical point of
view. Note that the number of suppressors or detectors are not restricted. A given vessel
can have any number of suppressors (resp. detectors) but they can be of at most two
different types (resp. of the same type). Given an ignition, an unmitigated explosion is
assumed to occur when any one detector or any one suppressor fails.
• We also assume that there are at most two different types of vent panels on any vessel.
• In practice, there may be multiple flame paths between two vessels. We will consider these
paths to be independent and compute the total probability of flame propagation over all
paths in such cases. In the example of section 5, we have shown the individual probabilities
along each path for completeness; please see table 5 in the Appendix.
• Pred , P s , tb , tf and the fundamental flame propagation probabilities Qsf (defined in the
next section) are assumed to be known and are assumed to be stationary through time.
4.2 Definition of model parameters
In the model for computation of risk based on a graph representation, each vertex i of the
system is characterised by a set of parameters described in this section.
(1) QE(i) is the probability of an occurrence of an ignition event in any vessel i , which,
if not effectively suppressed or vented, will result in an unmitigated explosion. For a
given process plant and over a given period of time, we assume that
∑
iQE(i) = 1, i.e.
we compute the probability of an unmitigated explosion given an ignition in one of the
vessels.
(2) k1(i) and k2(i) are the number of vent panels of type 1 and type 2 respectively, mounted
on vessel i. Default values of k1(i) and k2(i) are 0. If there is only one type of vent panel,
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then k1(i) denotes the number of vent panels and k2(i) = 0. Vent panels of different
types will have different mean time between failures (MTBFs) and different properties
with regards to achieved Pred .
(3) k3(i) is the number of detectors on a vessel i. There are two main ways of detecting an
ignition. Pressure detectors detect the change in pressure after sufficient combustion has
occurred, while flame detectors respond to incidents when the ignition location is close
to the detector. The speed of response of a pressure detector is almost independent of
ignition location, and a single detector can suffice for even large vessels. Note however
that a single flame detector placed far from the point of ignition may end up detecting
the ignition too late and fail to deploy explosion isolation measures in time to prevent
explosion propagation upstream/downstream. Multiple flame detectors can be placed
to cover the entire volume of larger vessels - often resulting in faster detection than with
pressure detection.
(4) k4(i) and k5(i) and are the number of suppressors of type 1 and type 2 respectively,
mounted on vessel i. Default values of k4(i) and k5(i) are 0. If there is only one type of
suppressor, then k4(i) denotes the number of suppressors and k5(i) = 0. As mentioned
in the previous section, there are many types of suppressors. It is realistic to assume
that there are at most two types of suppressors on any particular vessel.
(5) Assuming the time between failures to be a Poisson distributed random variable (see,
e.g. Grimmett and Stirzaker (2001), section 6.8), The probability of failure of a partic-
ular component j on vessel i in one random year is given by
pij(i) = 1− e−λj(i). (1)
For each vessel, parameters λj (which are reciprocals of the corresponding MTBFs) are
defined for vents of at most two different types (j = 1, 2), detectors of a single type
(j = 3) and suppressors of at most two different types (j = 4, 5). These parameters and
the values used in our spray drier example are tabulated in table 2. The MTBFs shown
in the table are not meant to be accurate or even pertinent for the specific hardware, but
are deemed to be representative for our purpose. For simplicity, we assume that pij(i)
for a given j is the same for all the vertices i in the graph, although different vessels
may have protection components of different makes (and hence different MTBFs) in
reality.
(6) In addition, different vessels are grouped together into zones (or equivalently, different
vertices are grouped together into sub-graphs). Each zone has a single control panel
with a specified MTBF (λ6(j) for a zone j). All the suppressors in a zone are deployed
simultaneously with any detection in the zone. Grouping protection systems into zones
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reduces the consequence of flame transfer between vessels in the same zone.
(7) A fast acting valve may be installed between two vessels i, k to reduce the possibility
of flame passage. Its MTBF is represented by λ7(i, k), with pi7(i, k) computed as in (1).
(8) If there is a suppressor installed on a pipe connecting two vessels i and j, its MTBF is
denoted by λ4(i, j) and the probability of its failure is denoted by pi4(i, j).
(9) Pred(i, j) is the reduced pressure at vertex i due to ignition at vertex j and P s(i) is
the pressure shock resistance of vertex i. Both Pred(i, j) and P s(i) are assumed to be
independent normal variables with specified means and variances which are assumed to
be stationary through time. The specified values of these parameters are intentionally
very conservative both representing the worst case, to err on the side of caution. A
judgement needs to be made about the choice of mean values of these variables to
ensure that the computation of risk is realistic and is not affected excessively by the
built-in safety factors in the design of any protection system. We have elected a standard
deviation of 10% of the nominal value for both Pred(i, j) and P s(i) , and the values
quoted for Pred(i, j) and P s(i) are two standard deviation limit values.
(10) Qvessel(i, j) represents the probability that the explosion protection hardware system
does not fail but the reduced pressure is still higher than the pressure shock resistance
of the vessel:
Qvessel(i, j) = P (Pred(i, j) − P s(i) > 0) . (2)
This allows us to represent the proximity of Pred(i, j) to P s(i) in the system design and
account for any intentional design safety factors in our computation of residual risk.
(11) In a similar manner we can define a set of parameters relating to the connectivity
between plant items and any isolation barriers installed. tb(i, j) is the time from ignition,
for the flame propagation barrier (either a chemical barrier or a valve) to be established
when the flame is propagating from an ignition in vessel i to vessel j and tf(i, j) is
the time that the flame front will arrive at the barrier location. tb(i, j) and tf(i, j) are
assumed to be independent normal variables with specified means and variances which
are stationary through time. Once again, the specified values of these parameters are
invariably very conservative, both representing the worst case to err on the side of
caution. For reasons similar to those employed for Pred(i, j) and P s(i) , we have chosen
to assume a standard deviation of 10% of the nominal value for both tb(i, j) and tf(i, j) ,
and that the values quoted for tb(i, j) and tf(i, j) are the two standard deviation limit
values. Qbarrier(i, j) in (3) represents the probability that the isolation barrier hardware
is actuated and the barrier is established, but the barrier is deployed too late to stop
the flame from reaching the next vertex.
Qbarrier(i, j) = P (tb(i, j) − tf(i, j) > 0) . (3)
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(12) Let Qsf (i, j) be the fundamental flame propagation probability between vertices i and j.
This will depend on duct diameter and length, the relative volumes of connected vessels,
the material explosibility etc. Relative magnitudes of these probabilities may be deter-
mined from qualitative knowledge. As an example, Qsf (2, 3) is likely to be significantly
higher than Qsf (1, 3) in the spray drier installation mentioned in the previous section,
for any realistic protection installation. The total flame propagation probability from
vertex i to vertex j, Qs(i, j), is the summation of the probability of complete hardware
failure of barrier and the probability due to late activation of barrier:
Qs(i, j) = Qsf (i, j)×
(
Qh(i, j) + (1−Qh(i, j))×Qbarrier(i, j)
)
(4)
where Qh(i, j) is the probability of hardware failure and (1−Qh(i, j))×Qbarrier(i, j)
is the failure due to late activation of barrier. Qh(i, j) may itself be computed as pi3(i)+
(1 − pi3(i))pi4(i, j) if the preceding vessel i is protected passively by explosion venting
and a single detector or as pi4(i, j) if the preceding vessel is protected by explosion
suppression. The reason for this difference is that the failure of detector in the latter
case will cause the vessel i to fail, and its role in the flame propagation to vessel j is
then insignificant. The case when the preceding vessel has multiple detectors can be
dealt by using β(i) defined in the next section in place of pi3(i), in the computation of
Qh(i, j) above.
When all the above parameters are specified for each vertex and each edge in the graph, we
have all the information necessary to compute residual risk in the system. There are a variety
of ways in which this information can be represented in software. The purpose of this paper,
however, is to outline a methodology rather than to discuss its precise implementation.
It is also worth mentioning that the residual risk computed using this method is valuable
mainly as a tool for comparison of different configurations of explosion protection systems,
e.g. using different types of suppressors on a vessel yielding different Pred or using a me-
chanical barrier (i.e. a valve) instead of a chemical barrier (i.e. a suppressor). Some of the
parameters above (such as Qsf (i, j)) have to be based on qualitative knowledge and some
of the assumptions are not realistic in all situations (such as the exact ignition location is
ignored). However, provided the same assumptions and the same parameters are used in
computing the residual risk for two or more safety system configurations, the model provides
very valuable information enabling the user to make an informed decision about the choice
of the safety system. We support this assertion by way of a detailed illustration in section 5.
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4.3 Algebraic formula for computation of risk
The risk of failure of any vertex i due to ignition in vertex j is denoted by Ri,j and it can
be computed as the sum of risk of hardware failure and the risk of inadequate protection:
R
′
i = α(i) + (1− α(i))β(i) + (1− α(i))(1− β(i))× γ(i), (5)
Ri,j = R
′
i + (1−R
′
i)×Qvessel(i, j) (6)
where α(i) = α1(i) + (1− α1(i))× α2(i)) is the probability of failure of any one vent panel.
The computation of α1(i) and α2(i) based on the number of vent panels is summarised in
table 3.
β(i) =
k3−1∑
j=0
(pi3(i))(1− pi3(i))j if k3 > 0,
= 0 otherwise
is the probability of failure of any one detector and γ(i) = γ1(i) + (1 − γ1(i))γ2(i) is the
failure probability of failure of any one suppressor. The computation of γ1(i), γ2(i) based on
the number of suppressors is summarised in table 4.
The terms in the expression (6) for Ri,j may be explained as follows. The first term in the
expression (5) for R
′
i represents an explosion due to an ignition event not being vented.
The second term represents an explosion due to an ignition event not being detected. The
last term represents an explosion due to failure of suppressor of either types. R
′
i as a whole
represents the probability that an unmitigated explosion occurs in vessel i due to hardware
failure, given an ignition event. Finally, the second term in the expression for Ri,j represents
the failure of vessel i due to partial or inadequate protection.
The risk of failure of any vertex due to an ignition in vertex i may be denoted by δi and can
be computed as:
δi = QE(i)
Ri,i + (1−Ri,i) ∑
j∈Φi
Qs(i, j)×Rj,i
 (7)
where Φi denotes the set of vertices adjacent to vertex i. Each Rj,i is computed as in (6). Note
that the first term represents an event where an ignition in vertex i causes an unmitigated
explosion in the vertex i. The second term with a summation over j represents an event
where there is no unmitigated explosion in vertex i given an ignition in the same vertex,
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however, the flame propagates to a neighboring vertex j causing an unmitigated explosion
in vertex j.
Instead of computing “per-ignition” risk (due to ignition in each vertex i) δi as above, one
may choose to compute “per-vertex” risk, i.e. the total risk of failure in each vertex due to
ignition in the same vertex or any of the connecting vertices. Denoting this risk by ζi, it can
be seen that
ζi = QE(i)×Ri,i +
∑
i∈Φj
QE(j)× (1−Rj,j)×Qs(j, i)×Ri,j (8)
The overall residual risk R is computed as
R =
∑
j
pi6(j) + (1− pi6(j))× ∑
i∈Ψj
ζi
 (9)
where the summation is over all zones and Ψ1,Ψ2, . . . are zones with corresponding control
panel MTBFs λ6(1), λ6(2) etc.
Note that the sum of probabilities can theoretically exceed unity in the computation of ζi,
δi etc. However, the risk of failure in any vessel approaching unity would be an unrealistic
(and certainly unacceptable) scenario in any practical safety installation and we have chosen
to ignore such unrealistic cases from our model. If necessary, these cases can be dealt with
using min(·, 1) operator throughout the computation of probability parameters. In case where
min(·, 1) is used to limit probability to 1, R can no longer be interpreted as a probability.
However, it will still serve as a (somewhat heuristic) measure of residual risk.
Here, it is worth re-emphasizing that the risk R is computed for one unit of time and
a different value will be obtained if we consider a different length of time (and hence a
different set of parameters). In any case, the proposed computational model can not be
expected to yield an exact value of residual risk for a particular length of time, since some of
the underlying assumptions are based on qualitative knowledge and can not be easily verified.
However, as mentioned in section 4.2, the main purpose of this model is to compare two or
more safety configurations under the same set of parameters, time horizon and assumptions.
From a representational point of view, it is possible to model R
′
i in (5) as a fault tree (see,
e.g. Bedford and Cooke (2001) and O’Connor (2002)). However, this does not seem to benefit
the actual computation of residual risk and hence is not explored further.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning that knowledge of graph theory is not required for the imple-
mentation of the model. The representation of the system is in terms of a set of vertices,
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which may be represented by a variety of data structures, while the computational model is
in terms of simple algebraic formulae.
5 Example of the computation of residual risk
5.1 Description of the process
Figure 1 shows our example of a simple spray drying process, with its vertices enumerated in
table 1. Using suitable fuel explosibility rate constant, maximum explosion pressure, vessel
volumes, vessel strengths, detection pressures and vent activation pressures for the protec-
tion system it is possible to derive predicted reduced explosion pressures for each plant item,
either using proprietary software (e.g. Siwek and Cesana (2001)) or in-house software pack-
ages (the numerical values used for computation of model parameters are available from
the authors). Of course, other means for calculating or deriving these pressures are equally
valid. Those pertinent to our example are shown in table 5. Table 6 lists the tb , tf and
Qbarrier(i, j) values for those plant interconnections where explosion isolation is employed.
tb and tf have been calculated using our in-house calculation tools with representative hard-
ware and input parameters, such as material explosibility, vessel size, duct diameter and
process air flow. Once again other means for calculating these times are equally valid.
Finally we need to determine the probability of flame propagation between vertices. As
described in section 4.2, this comprises terms for the hardware Qh(i, j) and the fundamental
flame propagation probability Qsf (i, j). We must ascribe a value for the latter, and this is
subject to a degree of uncertainty. However, with the large corpus of experimental data
available both in the literature and in-house, it is possible to determine ‘representative’
values depending on the particular geometric configuration (source vessel, duct diameter
and length etc.) and material explosibility.
The connectivity parameters relevant of our example are shown in table 5 and are deemed
representative for the example process plant and elected isolation hardware. It should be
noted that in the case where there are multiple flame paths between vertices (e.g. there are
three between the two fluid bed driers), then the arithmetic sum of the probabilities is taken
to err on the side of safety. We can now calculate the residual risk of safety system failure
due to either an ignition in vertex i (per-ignition risk, δi) or the total risk of failure of each
vertex due to ignition in any vertex (per-vertex risk, ζi). These residual risks are shown in
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tables 7 and 8 respectively. We have assumed in this instance that the probability of ignition
for each vertex is equal, which is not unreasonable considering the nature of the spray drying
process. However, this would not be the case in a process plant where one vessel was much
more likely to have an explosion due to the propensity of ignition sources (e.g. sparks from
a grinder).
For the same process and the same protection hardware, the safety configuration can be
changed by changing the zones in the protection system. From figure 1 we can see that the
protection system is divided into three discrete ‘zones’, whereby detection in any one zone
leads to the actuation of all the suppressors in that zone only. From table 5 we can see
there is a high level of connectivity between the two fluid bed driers, and the consequence of
flame transfer would lead to an enhanced explosion in the connected vessel. This enhanced
secondary explosion is likely to be more severe than the point ignition assumption that was
used in designing the explosion protection on this plant item. This of course affects the
calculated risk for this vertex as can be seen by the magnitude of Qvessel(2, 3). In order to
reduce this risk, it would be common practice to merge zone 2 and zone 3 such that actuation
of either detector on the fluid bed driers would deploy both suppression systems. This will
significantly reduce the explosion severity in the connected vessel since any flame that does
transfer will be trying to ignite an atmosphere that will be engulfed in suppressant. This is
represented in our calculation as can be seen from table 9 where the residual risk in both
the fluid bed driers (ζ2 and ζ3) is now much reduced.
It is interesting to continue this line of action and combine the whole protection system
into a single zone and recalculate ζi, see table 10. With all three vessels under the same
control zone, Qsf (i, j) for the connections between these vessels is set to zero. While this
yields further reduction in ζ2 and ζ3, the isolation barriers no longer add benefit in terms of
residual risk and may be considered an inefficient use of financial resources directed towards
plant safety. Further, a single zone system is more prone to nuisance actuations.
The interested reader is referred to Ganguly et al. (2007), Lade and Moore (2008) and Moore
and Lade (2009) for further and more extensive use of this model of computing the residual
risk of safety system failure.
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6 Conclusion
This paper addresses the problem of ascribing residual risk for an industrial explosion pro-
tection system. Drawing on the domain knowledge of explosion protection professionals, we
have designed a simple but effective algebraic model based on bi-directed graphs to compute
the residual risk. This also demonstrates the adaptation of existing analytical tools in oper-
ational research to challenging, real life problems. The proposed model captures the residual
risk of a protection installation in a meaningful way and allows us to analyze quantitatively
the cost/benefit trade-offs in different protection system configurations. Even though some of
the mathematical tools used will be unfamiliar to the process engineers, the actual method-
ology is quite simple to implement and does not require knowledge of graph theory. The
authors feel that this model is an extremely useful aid for better and more informed design
decisions, leading to enhanced overall process safety and greater overall cost effectiveness in
protection system design.
The methodology presented here is suited for explosion protection systems in industrial
process plants. Modification and adaptation of this model to address specific issues in the
computation of risk for other explosion protection applications, such as protection on offshore
platforms, is a topic of current research.
At present, this methodology has been implemented on trial examples in a prototype software
at Kidde Research,UK. A full-scale implementation along with drafting of the required design
rules and carrying out the necessary physical experiments is currently in progress.
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Appendix
Tables for the Spray Drier Example
Table 1. List of vertices for Spray Drier example
Vertex Component
1 Spray drier
2 Fluid bed drier 1
3 Fluid bed drier 2
4 Cyclone 1
5 Cyclone 2
Table 2. Notation for pij(i) and values for the spray drier example (only one type of vent
panel assumed)
Component j 1
λj(i)
pij(i) (or pij(i, k) for valve)
vent panel type 1 1 50000 0.000020
detector 3 4000 0.000250
suppressor type 1 4 30000 0.000033
suppressor type 2 5 50000 0.000020
control panel 6 25000 0.000040
valve 7 2000 0.000500
16
Table 3. Computation of α1(i) and α2(i) based on the number of vent panels (k1(i), k2(i))
and pij(i) as defined in equation (5).
k1 = k2 = 0 k1 > 0, k2 = 0 k1 > 0, k2 > 0
α1 0
∑k1−1
j=0 (1− pi1(i))j × pi1(i)
∑k1−1
j=0 (1− pi1(i))j × pi1(i)
α2 0 0
∑k2−1
j=0 (1− pi2(i))j × pi2(i)
Table 4. Computation of γ1(i) and γ2(i) based on the number of suppressors (k4(i), k5(i))
and pij(i) as defined in equation (5).
k4 = k5 = 0 k4 > 0, k5 = 0 k4 > 0, k5 > 0
γ1 0
∑k1−1
j=0 (1− pi4(i))j × pi4(i)
∑k1−1
j=0 (1− pi4(i))j × pi4(i)
γ2 0 0
∑k2−1
j=0 (1− pi5(i))j × pi5(i)
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Table 5. Probabilities of flame propagation through interconnections.
(i, j) Qsf (i, j) Q
h(i, j) Qvessel(i, j)
(1,2) 5.20× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(1,2) 8.98× 10−3 3.33× 10−5 1.00
(1,3) 5.13× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(1,4) 2.86× 10−2 1.00 1.82× 10−2
(1,5) 2.86× 10−2 1.00 1.82× 10−2
(2,1) 5.75× 10−3 5.00× 10−4 5.95× 10−11
(2,1) 8.12× 10−3 1.00 5.95× 10−11
(2,3) 5.40× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(2,3) 8.98× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(2,3) 5.48× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(3,1) 5.75× 10−3 5.00× 10−4 1.00
(3,2) 5.48× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(3,2) 8.12× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(3,2) 5.48× 10−3 1.00 1.00
(4,1) 1.05× 10−1 1.00 5.95× 10−11
(4,5) 2.60× 10−1 1.00 1.82× 10−2
(5,1) 1.05× 10−1 1.00 5.95× 10−11
(5,4) 2.60× 10−1 1.00 1.82× 10−2
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Table 6. Qbarrier(i, j) for two isolation barriers
Qbarrier(i, j)
Isolation barrier 1 (1,2) 2.09× 10−5
Isolation barrier 2 (2,1) 2.34× 10−3
Isolation barrier 2 (3,1) 6.66× 10−11
Table 7. Risk computation per ignition (with three zones)
δ1 3.41× 10−3
δ2 6.49× 10−3
δ3 6.26× 10−3
δ4 3.14× 10−3
δ5 3.14× 10−3
Table 8. Risk computation per vessel (with three zones)
ζ1 1.11× 10−4
ζ2 7.95× 10−3
ζ3 7.77× 10−3
ζ4 4.64× 10−4
ζ5 4.64× 10−4
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Table 9. Risk Computation per vessel (with two zones)
ζ1 1.11× 10−4
ζ2 2.23× 10−3
ζ3 2.25× 10−3
ζ4 4.64× 10−4
ζ5 4.64× 10−4
Table 10. Risk Computation per vessel (with one zone)
ζ1 1.10× 10−4
ζ2 7.37× 10−4
ζ3 7.37× 10−4
ζ4 4.64× 10−4
ζ5 4.64× 10−4
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